In theory, individual producer responsibility (IPR) creates incentives for 'design-for-recycling'. Yet in practice, implementing
Introduction
The terminology 'extended producer responsibility' (EPR) is internationally defined in various ways. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) refers to EPR as (. . .) an environmental policy approach in which a producer's responsibility for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of a product's life cycle. (OECD, 2004: p. 9 ).
The main idea of EPR is the internalization of social and environmental life-cycle costs of a product into the product price (Lindhqvist, 2000) . In particular, product prices should reflect the costs for their end-of-life treatment and disposal (OECD, 2001) . EPR provides incentives for producers to consider environmental end-of-life aspects already at the stage of product design (OECD, 2001 ).An obligation for producers to take back their products at the end of the life-cycle constitutes the central measure to implement the internalization principle and to spur changes in product design (Kloepfer, 2001; Lindhqvist, 2000) . According to OECD, 'take-back requirements are the primary EPR regulatory instrument' (OECD, 2004: p. 207 ).
Producers may fulfill their responsibilities either in a collective or an individual way. In case of collective producer responsibility (CPR), producers are collectively responsible for all end-of-life products. In contrast, the concept of individual producer responsibility (IPR) implies that producers bear responsibility exactly for the products they produce, which in theory provides the best incentives for design-forrecycling. The extent of this responsibility and its organizational implementation are discussed by Hicks (2005) , van Rossem et al. (2006a, b) , Hieronymi (2007) and Chancerel et al. (2007) . Figure 1 shows different options for waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) collection and treatment systems under an IPR regime, including individual collection with individual treatment, collective collection with brand sorting and individual treatment or collective collection without sorting, but with differentiation of recycling costs. Accordingly, IPR can also be achieved under collective systems. However, differentiating manufacturers' recycling costs under a collective scheme requires data on producers' shares of the total WEEE flow, which can be determined through sampling and brand counting (Linnell et al., 2007) .
For the application of individual producer responsibility in the electric and electronic equipment (EEE) industry, several specific characteristics of the sector and its material flows have to be considered:
. diversity and heterogeneity of the products, . variations among product types or within one product type among brands over the time due to technical innovations,
. time gap between putting on the market and appearance in the waste flow, which can also vary depending on equipment type, producer or other factors, . large number of producers in the sector, . lack of contact between producers and customers during the stage of usage and at the end of product life, . gap between expected and measured waste flow due to informal disposal ways and storage. . These characteristics increase the organizational, logistical and financial efforts required for implementing individual approaches of producer responsibility in the EEE industry.
The objective of this article is to show possibilities of implementing IPR schemes and incentives for producers to join these under German WEEE legislation. In addition, practical aspects of a brand sampling scheme for the determination of return shares are sketched based on a study on behalf of the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA) addressing requirements of statistical validated methods.
IPR in the WEEE directive and in the German 'ElektroG'
The European Directive 2002/96/EC on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE Directive) entered into force on 13 February 2003. In Germany, legislation on WEEE collection and treatment had been proposed for many years. Only after the European Directive entered into force, an agreement on WEEE legislation became possible. The 'Act 
IPR

Subjects of responsibility
The WEEE Directive and the ElektroG identify and regulate the following subjects of responsibility (Schill 2007) .
. Responsibility for design.
. Responsibility for collection.
. Responsibility for the coordination of take-back obligations. . Responsibility for treatment and recycling. . Financial responsibility.
. Responsibility for monitoring and reporting.
. Responsibility for labelling and consumer information.
Shared responsibility according to ElektroG
According to the European Directive, producers are responsible for WEEE treatment. However, responsibility for collection is not clearly defined. The German legislation differentiates between WEEE from private households (B2C) and from other parties (B2B). Municipalities are obliged to install municipal collection points, where endusers from private households can discard WEEE free of charge (collection of B2C waste).
Municipalities collect waste equipment in in five groups (collection groups CG) that differ from the ten categories defined in the WEEE directive 2002/96/EC (Table 1) . In doing so, special containers are used (in general 30 m 3 , 3 m 3 for lighting equipment). Containers are provided for pick-up by producers and further transport and treatment, again free of charge.
In addition to the municipal collection scheme for B2C WEEE, producers may choose to set up and operate individual or collective take-back systems for WEEE from private households. In this case, the producer has to cover all additional costs of collection, which are otherwise allocated to the municipalities. Retailers may voluntarily accept returned WEEE and transport it to the producer or the municipal collection points. As a result, there are different waste flows which can be controlled by producers only to some extent. Figure 2 provides an overview of legal and illegal WEEE end-of-life paths and indicates which ones are covered by the ElektroG.
One of the fundamental issues of IPR implementation refers to a producer's access to WEEE flows in general and to its own branded products in particular. Only the utilization of own take-back systems gives a producer direct access to its WEEE -given that consumers make use of these systems. In contrast, collective municipal WEEE collection in different groups results in producer collectives that share obligations and responsibilities.
The ElektroG established a national clearing house and register (Stiftung Elektro-Altgera¨te Register, EAR), serving both as a coordinating body for container pick-up (allocation of responsibilities) and a national register for producers. One of the main functions of this clearing house is to calculate and coordinate producers' take-back obligations for containers from the municipal collection system based on a specific algorithm (Stiftung EAR, 2005) .
Individual versus collective responsibility
Regarding the allocation of responsibilities for container pick-up from municipal collection sites, the EU directive 2002/96/EC differentiates between waste from products put on the market prior to and later than 13 August 2005, often referred to as 'historic' and 'new' WEEE. For 'new' WEEE from private households, each producer is made responsible for financing take-back operations 'relating to the waste from his own products' (Art. 8(2) WEEE Directive). Accordingly, producers have to cover the take-back costs only and exclusively of their own products (Holz, 2004) . This feature of the directive was happily embraced by the proponents of IPR: 'we can conclude that the proponents of individual solutions won first the support of the European Parliament and, subsequently, the acceptance by the Council of Ministers' (Lindquist and Lifset, 2003: p. 4, van Rossem, 2006b) . For 'historic' WEEE, all producers selling new products the time the end-of-life costs occur have to 'contribute Gas discharge lamps (Cat 5) 5
Small household appliances (Cat 2), lighting equipment, electric and electronic tools (Cat 6), toys, sports and leisure equipment (Cat 7), medical products (Cat 8), monitoring and control instruments (Cat 9).
proportionately' (Art. 8(3) WEEE Directive), which can be interpreted as collective producer responsibility. Notably, the WEEE Directive and the ElektroG differ regarding the assignment of financial responsibilities. The Directive states that each producer is financially responsible for waste from his own products in case of 'new' WEEE, and for a share proportional to his actual market share in the case of 'historic' WEEE. In contrast, the differentiation between 'new' and 'historic' WEEE in the ElektroG does not relate to financial responsibility per se, but rather to the calculation of responsibilities for container pick-up in the municipal takeback system.
Concerning 'new' WEEE, producers can opt for one of two different methods for calculating their obligations in Germany: On the one hand, producers can choose to consider their 'verified share of clearly identifiable WEEE, arrived at through sorting or application of scientifically recognized statistical methods, in the total quantity of WEEE according to equipment type' ( §14(5) Nr.1 ElektroG). This is referred to as the 'return share'' option. In this case, the producer has to cover the costs of sorting or statistical methods (Bullinger and Fehling, 2005) . On the other hand, producers can opt for using their 'share of the total quantity of electrical and electronic equipment per type of equipment placed on the market in the previous calendar year' (Section 14(5) Nr.2 ElektroG). This option is referred to as 'market share' allocation. Note that the ElektroG differentiates 'Type of equipments' as 'equipment in a given category which has comparable characteristics in terms of its uses or functions'. Registration of products and calculation of takeback regulation though the clearing house is based on the share of equipment types. The share of equipment types is annually determined and certified on behalf of the clearing house and published online. So far, no producer has opted for the first calculation method, and it is unclear how the simultaneous application of both options will work out in practice (Chancerel et al., 2007) .
Brand count schemes outside Europe
Internationally, the United States of America are experienced with return share cost allocation for WEEE and determination of return shares. To date, there is no federal US legislation directly addressing collection and recycling of WEEE. However, states such as Maine Washington (in 2006) have set up their own EPR schemes for households (Maine DoEP, 2008; Washington State DoE, 2007) . Manufacturers pay for the recycling of selected covered electronic products in the scheme (e.g. televisions, portable DVD players, game consoles, computer monitors). Collection sites or collection events are provided by municipalities or private collectors. Consumers deliver their WEEE to these collection locations. Note that consumer participation is optional in many US states, as opposed to the situation in Europe. All WEEE collected in this system are recycled meeting defined standards. In both states, a manufacturer's return share is used to assess charges and divide the costs of operating the recycling processes among participating manufacturers. The difference between both schemes is that Maine conducts a full brand count while in Washington regular brand sampling is carried out (van Wassenhove et al., 2010) .
Beyond the e-waste law programmes in Washington and Maine a number of brand count investigations were carried out in the US such as in Florida, West Virginia and Illinois. Commercial user B2B Figure 2 . Different WEEE channels and their coverage in the German ElektroG.
They cover both permanent collection schemes and eventbased collections. Unlike the European scheme, the scope of covered equipment is limited to selected information technology and consumer equipment like monitors, TV, desktop personal computers, laptops and similar. Issues of data availability and quality are becoming increasingly important, as historic data has been used to determine manufacturer's collection responsibilities. The National Center for Electronics Recycling (NCER) has issued a handbook, Brand Recording Best Management Practices for Electronics Recycling Programs (http://www.electronicsrecycling.org/public/ ContentPage.aspx?pageid¼55) and is sustaining a webbased information system called, The Brand Data Management System (BDMS) (http://www.electronicsrecycling.org/BDMS/) 'to allow all stakeholders interested in emerging electronics recycling systems in the US the opportunity to view and customize brand return share reports from across the country'
There is very little information published on the procedure and cost of brand sampling. Both the Maine and the Washington schemes are based on brand sampling, whereas the Washington scheme draws on BDMS data in the introductory period.
Developing a method for determining return shares in WEEE management schemes
Sorting procedure
The determination of the 'verified share of clearly identifiable WEEE' according to Section 14(5) Nr.1 ElektroG requires 'scientifically recognized statistical methods'. In this context, a research project commissioned by the German Environmental Protection Agency (UFO-Plan 206 31 300) investigated the requirements and feasibility of these statistical methods (Bilitewski et al., 2008) . In particular, the ''share of 'new' WEEE of producer relative to all 'new' WEEE per equipment type'' is determined according to ElektroG.
In a first step, the population of the statistical investigation has to be fixed. The ElektroG defines 'the total quantity of WEEE according to equipment type' as the population. Taking this literally would require determining producers' shares in all WEEE channels ( Figure 2 ). For practical reasons, the responsible authority in Germany suggested to consider only the 30 m 3 containers from the official municipal collection system for B2C waste (3 m 3 only for collection group IV -gas discharge lamps).
After defining the population, the sampling unit and the sorting procedure have to be established. Since WEEE is collected in groups (Table 1) in uniform containers of 30 or 1 m 3 , respectively, one container can be defined as a sampling unit. During sorting, several criteria have to be checked in order to identify the investigation's parameter. Every container in the sample has to be sorted according to the . share of new waste, . share of equipment type, . producers' shares within one equipment type.
In addition, all waste that is determined as 'non-WEEE' or not clearly identifiable (referred as orphans), has to be sorted out as collective producer responsibility applies for this fraction (Figure 3 ).
Determination of the sample size for a pilot test investigation
Regarding sample sizes, two approaches are practised in waste sampling: (a) fixed percentage of the population (non-statistical based sampling) or b) statistical sampling. Usually, 1% of the population is recommended as a sample size for waste-sorting analyses (VKF, 1963) . The statistical sampling always requires a priori knowledge of the investigated population. A statistical sampling approach considers the distribution function and statistical parameters of the variation of the investigated parameter in the population. For example, assuming t-distributed parameters, the relevant sampling size can be calculated according to equation (1) (ASTM, 2003; LFUG, 1998) .
where n is the minimum number of required samples; v is the variation coefficient of the parameter of investigation (%); e rel is the admissible relative error (%); t a,nÀ1 is the t value with n À 1 degrees of freedom and the alpha level. At the onset of German WEEE take-back operations, the statistical distribution of the return share of individual producers within an equipment type in the containers of the municipal collection scheme was unknown. The required statistical a priori information can be provided by a pilot test that helps understanding the statistical viability of the parameter 'return share' as a key feature when implementing IPR based on brand sampling. In order to assess possible statistical variation of the investigated parameter and thus requirements for the pilot test, the following simplifying assumptions were made in order to derive a best case estimate for the return share variation of a producer with an average market share:
. equal market shares of all producers, . regional or temporal variations are disregarded, . illegally discarded WEEE in the container is disregarded, . normal distribution of average live time of EEE.
The share of 'new' WEEE and 'historic' WEEE, respectively, in a container influences the probability of finding a product of a producer and thus the expected statistical variation. In order to estimate the amount and share of 'new' WEEE, average lifetimes according to Chancerel and Rotter (2009) are assumed. Additionally, life time m is expected to be normally distributed. The coefficient of variation of the average life time is 30%. Under these assumptions, the share A of 'new' WEEE can be calculated according to the Gaussian formula:
where A is the share of 'new' WEEE; t is the time since implementation of ElektroG (23 November 2005); m is the average life time; and is the standard deviation of average life time.
In general the variation coefficient v is defined as:
where "
x is the average number of 'new' equipment per producer per container (see Table 2 ) and s is the standard deviation of x and
where n is the number of samples. The highest variation can be expected in the case in which just a few devices per producer can be expected in one 30 m 3 container. In the case that the average number of equipments per producer per container ( "
x) is less than one more than one container has to be investigated to have a chance to find at least one device.
If 1 "
x containers of collection group z are investigated (e.g. "
x ¼ 0.1 refers to 10 containers), ideally one device is found in one container and zero are found in the other nine containers.
Subsequently the following equations are valid for n ¼ 1
As a consequence s and v can be calculated according to Equation (5):
In a first approximation, key parameters for defining a minimum sample size for a pilot test were estimated and justified by model calculations (Bilitewski et al., 2008) . Table 2 summarizes the basic data relevant for estimating the number of specific equipment types per container of a collection group (CG).
Test sampling
In order to assess time requirements and, thus costs of brand sorting, a test sorting was conducted in Spring 2007. The objective of this test sorting was not to determine the coefficient of variation of the investigation parameter but the time needed for the full identification and recording of the required data. A total of 355 units of collection group 3 and 361 units of collection group 5 were collected in 1 m 3 boxes directly at the municipal collection point in Dresden-Kaditz (Germany) units were analysed and identified according to Figure 3 by two trained workers. In addition to the specific equipment parameter, the identification times (IT) were recorded for 'new' WEEE and for 'historic' WEEE.
Cost estimates for a pilot test
Cost estimates are based on the required sorting times and specific sorting costs.
. Salary sorting campaign supervisor (gross tariff salary in Germany 2007, including reserved time for sick leave and vacation): 39 300 E year À1 . . Salary assistant (without reserved time: 18 150 E year À1 . . General and administrative costs covering travel cost, consumables, administration, profit etc.: 100% of salary costs.
Assuming a team with one supervisor and one assistant, the total specific costs (SC) for a sorting team for brand sorting procedures amount to 120 000 E year À1 or approximately 60 E year À1 .
The total cost (TC) for the pilot test can be calculated according to Equation (5)
where n is the number of units of WEEE per container; IT is the identification time; N pilot is the number of containers to be sorted in the pilot test.
Practical aspects of the determination of individual producers' shares in WEEE Minimum sample size
Since the sampling unit was defined by German Environmental Protection Agency as container in the municipal collection scheme, the crucial question to be answered is how many containers have to be investigated in order to assess a minimum sample size for a return share investigation. So far there are no data on producer's return shares. Therefore, the coefficient of variation for the sorting parameter (''share of 'new' WEEE of producer z relative to all 'new' WEEE per equipment type'') was estimated. The highest variation can be expected in the case in which just a few devices per producer can be expected in one 30 m 3 container. In the case in which the average number of equipments per producer per container is less than one, more than one container has to be investigated to have a chance to find at least one device per container.
As shown in Table 2 , the number of devices of 'new' WEEE per equipment type is low, whereas the number of producers is high, particularly during the transitory period in which 'historic' waste is still dominating the waste flow. Frequently the number of registered producers per equipment type exceeds the number of 'new' equipment per equipment type, which reflects that the above-mentioned condition for the calculation of the coefficient of variation according to Equation (4) is fulfilled.
This results in high expected coefficients of variation. Only if 'historic' WEEE fades out of the waste stream, will the expected coefficient of variation be less than 300% for the average of all collection groups (Table 3) .
For assessing a suitable sample size for a pilot test, an optimistic estimate of the coefficient of variation of the parameter is shown in Table 3 . Based on the data shown in Table 2 , the sample size of a pilot test ranges between 100 and 2000 30 m 3 -containers to be sorted (Bilitewski et al., 2008) . The sample size varies with equipment type and the distribution of market shares of the producers involved. For the non-statistical sampling approach (fixed percentage of the population, here 1%), only collection group 3 requires a sampling size above 300 containers per investigation, because this collection group has the largest share in the municipal collection scheme (Figure 4) . For large household equipment, there is a significant difference between the statistical and the non-statistical sampling approach due to the smaller number of devices per container relative to other collection groups. For the statistical sampling scheme, the minimum size of a pilot test is between around 400 and above 1000 containers per investigation for collection groups 1, 2, 3 and 5. Only for gas discharge lamps (CG 4), the minimum sample size is around 100 containers, as the number of registered producers in this collection group is lower in comparison with other collection groups.
Time relevance
As mentioned before, the return-share allocation of obligations of container take-back from the municipal collection system is only applicable for 'new' WEEE. As long as there is a significant share of 'historic' WEEE, producers are collectively responsible for this WEEE based on their put-onmarket shares -independent from their actual shares in the waste stream. As shown in Figure 5 , the share of 'new' WEEE in collection group 3 (information technology and telecommunications equipment, consumer equipment) increases slowly. A level of 80% new WEEE in the waste stream will not be reached before 2012. Importantly, storage of old equipment in private households after usage is not considered in this calculation. It may take years for consumers to return WEEE to collection points. This collection group contains equipment with a relatively short average life-time (3 to 7 years). For large household equipment, a share of 80% new WEEE will not be reached before 2018 due to the long life time of the equipment (Bilitewski et al., 2008) . In reality, this may take even longer since the storage of unused equipment in private household is not considered in the life-time assumptions.
Accordingly, producers clearly lack incentives to opt for return share allocation, at least over the next few years. This lack of interest will be amplified by the fact that the costs of brand sampling are allocated to the producer and that the required sample sizes are high due to the specifics of the German system.
Cost estimates
Costs of manual brand sorting are mainly driven by labour cost and by the identification and registration time per sample unit and the number of sample units required for the investigation. A test sorting of 716 WEEE devices shows that the identification times for 'new' WEEE are higher than for 'historic' WEEE. This can be explained by the fact that each device of 'new' WEEE requires an additional identification step, as the producer differentiation is of relevance. Table 4 shows the number of items and the required identification time extrapolated for containers with 100% 'historic' or 100% 'new' waste. Given the existing knowledge on the share of 'historic' and 'new' waste, identification times for mixed containers can be estimated. . Estimated number of samples for a brand sorting scheme according to Section 14 Abs. 5 ElektroG for two different sampling approaches (assumptions for the statistical sampling e rel. 10%, t a,nÀ1 1.96). Figure 6 compares costs of the non-statistical and statistical sampling approach based on the identification times shown in Table 4 . The non-statistical 1% sampling approach would lead to cost of less than 100 000 E per investigation for collection groups 1 (large appliances), 2 (refrigerator and freezers), 4 (gas discharge lamps) and 5 (household and other small equipment). Requesting a 'statistical sampling approach' incurs cost of 300 000 to 900 000 E per investigation. Importantly, analyses have to be repeated annually. The required sample size for this annual investigation can not be forecast at this stage, but might reduce with an increasing data pool of return share information.
Influence of illegal WEEE disposal and orphan devices
As mentioned earlier, WEEE that is collected outside the municipal scheme is excluded from the population in Germany. This approach has a significant impact on the results in case of disproportionate producer shares in the alternative waste flows. This effect is particularly relevant for informal WEEE channels, but of minor importance in case of alternative formal take-back systems. If a producer can document compliant treatment of a waste stream via alternative legal take-back systems, that is, outside the municipal collection system, then its total take-back obligation is reduced accordingly by the clearing house. If a producer has a disproportionately large share in informal WEEE channels, its share in the legal take-back systems, and thus the take-back obligations, is reduced. Accordingly, the German system creates perverse incentives to channel WEEE into informal channels.
An additional issue to be addressed in the context of a fair allocation of responsibilities is the share of 'not clearly identifiable equipment' in the waste flow. The share of orphans is increasing the share of collective responsibility and thus also the required sample size.
Discussion
Incentives to choose the IPR option
The study shows that an investigation determining the return share of a producer according to the requirements of the German ElektroG requires a large sample size and, accordingly, incurs high costs. So far, no producer in Germany has opted for the return share allocation. Reasons for the reluctance are manifold. Producers would benefit from a return share allocation in case that they have a higher market share in comparison with their return share. That is specifically the case for new brands and growing market segments. But here the incentives given do not offset the additional cost to be carried by the initiating producer. Other reasons for this phenomenon are a disproportionate flow of products in WEEE channel outside the municipal collection scheme. 'Cherry picking' through informal collection such as door-to-door collection or street collection are formally outside the German law but frequently observed phenomena. Janz et al. (2009) estimated the share of informal export to Eastern Europe amounted to between 35 000 and 120 000 t year À1 (2007 data). Sander et al. (2010) quantify the amount of illegal WEEE export via Hamburg harbour to between 93 000 and 216 000 t year À1 (2008 data). In addition, Chancerel (2010) showed that an amount of 90 000 t year À1 is discarded through the residual waste bin and not recycled (2007 data). These numbers have to be compared to the 1 600 000 t of EEE put on the market in 2007 and the 586 966 t of WEEE reported as collected in the official recycling scheme. With this high share of 'informal' WEEE flowing outside the scope of the brand sorting scheme, a fair allocation of take-back obligation is difficult to achieve. Brand sorting does not improve a producer's incentives for design-for-recycling, because take-back obligations still include WEEE from other producers. Changes in product design of their own products thus will not lead to improved recycling or valorization during recycling. Gottberg et al. (2006) emphasize that the design incentive for the lighting sector 'would be limited due to product characteristics of lamps, varying recycling techniques among recyclers and the fact that competitors were seen as equally affected by producer responsibility legislation'. For very heterogeneous collection groups such as household and other small Figure 6 . Estimation of cost for a brand sorting scheme according to Section 14 Abs. 5 ElektroG for two different sampling approaches (assumptions for the statistical sampling e rel. 10%, t a,nÀ1 1.96). equipment, similar constraints can be expected. In addition, recyclers must be able to differentiate costs between products with respect to recycling costs or the content of valuable materials by brand in order for the individual manufacturer to benefit from design changes.
The approach of cost differentiation assumes significant costs of the recycling process. Increasing prices of raw materials and secondary raw materials lead to a situation in which most collected WEEE fractions earn revenues apart from collection group 2 (refrigerators and freezers) and collection group 4 (gas discharge lamps). For these two groups, additional fees have to be paid for recycling. In the light of increasing secondary raw material prices many municipalities in Germany commit to recycle all equipment of a specific collection group for at least 1 year under their own responsibility. A total of 413 out of 530 municipalities chose this option for collection group 1 (large household equipment) in 2008 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011) . This option for the municipalities was included in the ElektroG in order to protect existing recycling infrastructure that was put in place prior to the WEEE Directive for instance social projects. However, this provision limits producers' access to their own WEEE.
By default, each producer will choose in the future the most favourable option from the individual producers' perspective. This may result in a gap in covering the costs for all returned products if all high market share companies with zero or minimal return share decided to opt for the return share method while companies with low market shares but relatively high return shares opt for the other alternative. This issue is until now not addressed in the current legislation.
Collection: a major obstacle for IPR Current collection practice in Germany is clearly a major obstacle to IPR, as the municipal collection scheme results in a mix of brands within five collection groups, which is quite the opposite of individual producer take-back programmes. As differentiated end-of life costs are a main requirement for the realization of IPR (van Rossem et al., 2006b) , the 'municipal' WEEE mix would have to be allocated to individual producers involving all the practical problems outlined above. Given the mentioned allocation and identification problems, producer-specific collection systems would constitute a decisive step toward realizing IPR.
However, consumers would have to make proper use of such individual take-back systems. Moreover, there is an obvious disincentive for producers to set up individual systems, since in this case they would have to finance collection on their own. In contrast, collection in the current system is financed by municipalities. As collection costs account for a large part of total take-back costs, producers have a strong financial incentive to use the current municipal system. Likewise, there is a related disincentive regarding statistical or sorting analyses required for the return share option of Section 14(5) ElektroG: if producers opt for this alternative, they have to cover the additional costs (Bullinger and Fehling, 2005) .
Accordingly, it is argued that there is an urgent need 'to level the economic playing-field' between individual and collective EPR schemes, which particularly includes 'internalizing the full costs of end-of-life including collection' (van Rossem et al., 2006a: p. ix) . From a legal perspective, this would clearly be possible, since the WEEE Directive demands that 'producer provide at least for the financing of collection' from collection points (Art. 8(1) WEEE Directive). In this regard, Holz (2004) criticizes the fact that the German ElektroG missed the opportunity to translate this provision and thereby to fully implement the internalization principle.
Several options have been proposed to make producers responsible for collection in practice. For example, it is possible to draw on existing collection points, if municipalities are compensated by manufacturers. In fact, this is common practice in many US states. Ba¨umer et al. (2004a, b) outline how this could be done with special regard to competition issues. Furthermore, retailers could be involved in collection. As the number of electronics retailers in Germany is much larger than the number of existing WEEE collection points (Alkert, 2003) this could bring about a significant improvement of the collection infrastructure. Countries in which retailers are involved in WEEE collection have much higher collection rates than countries where this is not the case (Magalini and Huisman, 2006) . This is particularly true for countries where retailers have to take back all consumer WEEE, even if the customer does not purchase new products, as in Switzerland, Norway and Sweden (Magalini and Huisman, 2006) .
In addition, producers could set up their own take-back systems, for example, in combination with own brand stores or customer service centres. Furthermore, alternative collection logistics could be explored, such as postal collection for small electronics (Ba¨umer et al., 2004b) . A recent VDI guideline lists the feasibility of several collection systems such as collection boxes, depository containers, etc. for the collection of different WEEE types (Bru¨ning, 2007) .
Comparison with US brand count schemes
In the USA, data on brand sampling and brand count schemes are centrally made available by the BDMS (Linnell et al., 2007) . They allow estimating regional and temporal variations and the statistical significance of brand sampling investigations. For the brand sampling scheme in Washington state, NCER developed a method in which the sampling size depends on the largest producers share. With a return share of 7%, the number of samples (individual devices) required is 10 000 units, which results in costs of 28 627 E according to Wassenhove et al. (2010) .
In Europe, no a priori information of producer's return shares and the statistical variation of these shares is available (Bilitewski et al., 2008) . This information is essential for determining a statistically sound sampling approach that minimizes costs and maximizes the reliability of such investigations.
In general, the specifics of the German brand sampling IPR scheme leads to large sample size requirements and high cost relative to the schemes in Maine and Washington, as it includes the following requirements.
A wide range of covered equipment, which leads to a large population of producers being affected, and high expected variations of the parameter of investigation.
A mixed collection containing more than one type of equipment per collection group.
The fact that only 'new' waste is covered in a return share cost allocation, such that variation of the parameter of investigation in the transition time is particularly high.
A national scope for the ElektroG in Germany relative to regional or state-wide schemes in the USA.
The fact that producers in Germany can opt between two different allocation modes reduces the incentives for real IPR schemes since each producer may individually select the most beneficial option, depending on market shares and return shares. The responsibility for brand sampling investigations is not centrally organized in Germany, which forces producers to provide certified investigation results.
Conclusions
This article discusses possibilities of implementing IPR schemes for WEEE and presents the German approach of individualizing EPR, which entails an alternative option for allocating individual take-back obligations. While these obligations are usually determined by market shares, the German approach suggests determining individual producer shares in the waste stream by brand sorting.
The practical implementation poses a number of unresolved problems and will only become relevant if the share of 'new' WEEE reaches a significant level, because this option is not applicable for 'historic' WEEE put on the market before 13 August 2006. Statistical considerations related to the existing collection scheme show that a large sample is required for those producers who want to follow the IPR approach.
However, a return share allocation might not imply a decisive step towards IPR in Germany, as it merely represents an alternative calculation of market shares (see Section 14(5) ElektroG). Yet, the fundamental characteristics of the take-back system remain unchanged: the same anonymous mix of WEEE goes to the same treatment operations as in the put-on-market alternative. Accordingly, producers' incentives for design-for-recycling remain limited. However, return share allocation may be considered as a first step towards IPR. Labelling and sorting of own-brand equipment by radio frequency identification (RFID) may enable future IPR schemes, although the costs and benefits of this technology have to be thoroughly examined.
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